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1
Variance analysis and linear contracts in agencies with
distorted performance measures
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning
objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A risk-
neutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives post-
contract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the performance mea-
sure is informative with respect to the agent’s marginal product concerning the
principal’s objective, variance investigation can alleviate effort misallocation.
These results carry over to a participative budgeting situation, but in this case
the variance investigation procedures are less demanding.
2
1 Introduction
Variance investigation has frequently been the subject of management accounting re-
search in terms of both facilitating and influencing decision-making. Such research
has often concentrated on incentive effects. From the agency perspective, the liter-
ature has mainly focused on the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives. This
viewpoint essentially reduces the agency problem to the question of which contrac-
tual agreement can induce a certain desired action at minimal cost. Several results on
the use of variance analysis procedures have been derived by applying the Holmstro¨m
(1979) informativeness criterion. The crucial requirement for useful variance inves-
tigation in this context is the provision of additional information with respect to the
agent’s action. If observation of an overall result is not statistically sufficient, there are
potential gains from analyzing further details regarding the agent’s actions (Baiman
and Demski 1980a). 1
In the last decade, however, economic agency research has emphasized the misal-
location of effort rather than the trade-off between risk and incentives as the central
issue in the provision of incentives. Starting with Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), a
rich literature has analyzed the effects of dysfunctional behavior. This problem may
arise whenever an agent’s performance indicator does not fully accord with his princi-
pal’s objective, which can occur for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, the principal
could have a non-contractible objective such as the value of a privately traded firm. On
the other hand, the objective might be a very risky measure of the agent’s performance
and result in a high risk premium to be paid. In both cases, the principal may seek
alternative performance measures to provide contractual incentives. Such measures,
1In practical applications, these benefits of course have to be weighed against the cost of data gath-
ering, and conditional monitoring might become advantageous. See Baiman and Demski (1980b) and
Young (1986) for a detailed analysis.
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however, may induce effort allocations that do not coincide with those preferred by the
principal, particularly if the agent performs a variety of tasks.
Multi-dimensional effort may result for two reasons. First, the agent might work
on different tasks and have to decide not only on the total amount of effort, but also on
where to put it. Second, the agent’s productivity might depend on some state of nature
that he observes before choosing his action, leading to a state-contingent action. If the
principal’s objective and the performance measure are influenced by the state of nature
in different ways, a similar misallocation problem arises.
From an accounting perspective, an obvious question in both cases is whether man-
agement accounting procedures such as variance analysis can help to alleviate the
problem. To answer this question, I first analyze how additional input information
can best be incorporated into a linear contract. Building on these results, their rela-
tion to variance analysis procedures is then studied. It emerges that certain special
variances can be naturally interpreted as predictors of the agent’s impact on the firm’s
objective. Consequently, they appear in the agent’s compensation function. Distortion
of performance measurements is therefore another rationale for tying compensation
to variances in corporate practice. I derive these results for the second scenario of
post-contractual private information, for which the adoption of variance analysis pro-
cedures and participative budgeting has a more natural interpretation. However, since
the general effects of distortion are the same in both settings, the results on variance
investigation apply to the classical multi-task setting as well, with a slightly different
interpretation of variances.
In a broader sense, my aim is to connect two branches of literature: one on dis-
tortion in performance measurement, and the other on the use of variance analysis
procedures for incentive contracting. In the first respect, the paper is most closely
related to Baker (1992) and Feltham and Xie (1994). Like Baker, I consider the com-
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bined use of output and input data to improve the congruity of performance measures.
In addition, I consider the role of participation in budgeting and discuss the relation of
performance to accounting data. In this last respect, the paper is more closely related
to the work of Feltham and Xie, but they do not consider the use of accounting proce-
dures such as variance analysis. In this regard, I follow Darrough (1988) and Kloock
and Schiller (1997). Kloock and Schiller describe different decomposition methods
proposed for variance analysis, particularly in the German cost accounting literature.
I refer to them when I describe the optimal contract in terms of variance decomposi-
tion results. Kloock and Schiller present only verbal arguments on the use of variance
investigation for incentive purposes. I find evidence supporting their statements in a
quantitative interpretation of the model. Darrough (1988) considers the use of ex post
budgets in splitting the efficiency variance in cost accounting. Although Darrough
does not explicitly employ an agency model, both her work and mine use the agent’s
reaction to his pre-decision information. While in Darrough’s paper this information is
publicly observable ex post, in this paper only its impact on the performance measure
can be used for contracting. Accordingly, in Darrough’s paper an agent would always
choose the first-best input mix, whereas in my model implementation depends on the
relation of the principal’s objective and the agent’s performance measure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a general model
of distorted performance measurement under private information is described. Section
3 studies the impact of additional information and the role of variance analysis proce-
dures. Section 4 considers participative budgeting, and Section 5 draws conclusions
and discusses directions for future research.
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2 Distorted performance measurement under private information
To introduce the problem of distorted performance measurement under private infor-
mation, I adapt a model studied by Baker (1992). For this purpose, consider a risk-
neutral principal hiring a risk-neutral agent to perform a certain task on his behalf. The
agent takes an action a ∈ R+, which, along with a random variable δ ∈ [δ, δ] ⊂ R+,
determines the realization of the principal’s objective V (a, δ) = δa. By choosing a,
the agent incurs a private cost C(a) = a2/2. Thus, maximizing the total surplus2
V − C would require a = δ, equating the marginal product δ and the marginal cost
a of the agent’s effort. To study asymmetric information and performance measure
distortion, I assume that δ cannot be observed by the contracting parties. Only the
agent receives a signal φ ∈ R+, from which he imperfectly infers the realization of δ.
Up to this point, the setting is a linear-quadratic specification of the model studied in
the standard agency theory (Harris and Raviv 1979), for which, owing to the agent’s
risk-neutrality, a first-best solution could be achieved by selling the business to the
agent. The agent would use his information to maximize the conditional expectation
of V − C, choosing an action aFB = E[δ | φ].
I rule out this trivial case by assuming that V is not the value of the firm as a whole,
but only the agent’s contribution to the firm’s value, which cannot be separated from
the remaining assets and sold to the manager. Instead of selling the firm, incentives
therefore have to be provided by tying the agent’s compensation to a contractible per-
formance measure P . For instance, if V is the value added to a privately traded firm,
P might be some measure of short-term success such as profit or ROI.
Since such short-term performance may at least partly determine the total value
added by the manager, it is evident that we can allow that V and P are correlated. I
2We can focus on the total surplus of the agency because both parties are risk-neutral and no liability
constraints are considered.
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do so by assuming that P (a, φ, ν) = φa+ ν, where the sensitivity3 of the performance
measure is the agent’s private information φ. The noise term ν ∈ R with E[ν] = 0
is unobservable to both parties, and ensures that a forcing contract cannot be written.
Instead, the principal offers a linear payment scheme
S = s0 + sP (1)
to the agent.4 At the time this contract is signed, neither the principal nor the agent
has information about the realization of φ, and they have common beliefs about its
distribution. Before the agent chooses his action, however, φ becomes observable
to him. From this post-contractual information asymmetry, a chance to improve the
agent’s decision, as well as the problem of distorted performance measurement, arises.
To see this, first consider a situation in which the agent does not observe φ. Ig-
norant of φ, he chooses his action aNI = sE[φ] to maximize his expected utility
s0 + sE [P − C] = s0 + sE[φ]a − a2/2, and the principal can induce an action max-
imizing the expected total surplus E [V − C] by setting sNI = E[δ]/E[φ]. The agent
chooses aNI = E[δ], and an expected total surplus of E[V − C]NI = E[δ]2/2 accrues
to the agency.
Since the agent observes φ, however, he will choose his action according to the
realization of φ to maximize his expected utility s0 + sE[P − C | φ] = φa − a2/2.
To account for this, the principal will choose the contract parameters to maximize the
expected total surplus
E[V − S | s] = E[δa(s)− a(s)2/2] = sE[δφ]−
s2
2
E[φ2].
3See Banker and Datar (1989) for a definition.
4In general, the principal could make use of the agent’s information by offering menus of contracts.
These are analyzed in Section 4. For the time being, assume that φ cannot be communicated, and the
same contract has to be offered for all its realizations.
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The optimal contract specifies sPI = E[δφ]/E[φ2] (cf. Baker 1992), leading to a total
surplus
E[V − C]PI =
E[δφ]2
2E[φ2]
. (2)
Comparing the two outcomes yields the first result, concerning the value of informa-
tion:
Proposition 1 In the risk-neutral agency setting with unobservable effort and without
communication, the value of information to the agency may be positive or negative.
Proof First, assume δ and φ are such that E[δφ] = 0. Then E[V − S]PI = 0 ≤
E[V − S]NI , and the value of information is negative. On the contrary, if φ = δ,
for example, E[V − S]PI = E[δ2]/2 ≥ E[V − S]NI , and the value of information is
positive. 2
Proposition 1 is a well-known result in the standard agency model (Demski 1980,
p. 97f.; Christensen 1981, p. 669ff.). Here, it is asserted for two reasons. First, it
serves as a benchmark for the variance investigation procedures analyzed in the next
section. Second, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that if φ = δ, the full-information
outcome can be achieved. This raises the question as to how a weaker relation of
the two random variables affects the agency’s surplus. Baker (1992) states that it is
determined by the correlation of the two variables. Indeed, if (2) is written as
E[V − C]PI =
(E[δ]E[φ] + Cov[δ, φ])2
2E[φ2]
, (3)
it is obvious that the surplus is higher if δ and φ show a stronger (positive) correlation.
However, an inspection of (3) also makes it clear that the performance measure affects
the agency’s surplus not only by its correlation to the firm’s value, but also by its
absolute level. This may be illustrated by the following example.
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Example Let the marginal product δ be uniformly distributed on the unit interval
[0, 1] and the performance measure’s sensitivity be φ = h + δ, where h ∈ R+ is a
constant known to both contracting parties. Obviously, δ and φ are perfectly correlated.
The expected total surplus E[V − C]NI = (2 + 3h)2/(12 + 36h + 36h2), however,
depends on the value of h. It is equal to the full-information solution if h = 0, and
approaches the no-information solution for h→∞. 2
On first glance, the example seems to conflict with Baker’s (1992) result that if the
marginal products of V and P are perfectly correlated and have the same variance—
as is the case in the example—the first-best solution is obtained. The discrepancy
arises from the fact that Baker normalizes the performance measure with respect to
its marginal product, such that, translated to the present model, δ and φ would have
the same expectation. Demanding this in the above example, however, would lead to
δ = φ, in which case the first-best solution is obviously obtained.
¿From an accounting perspective, the example may well be interpreted in terms of
the controllability principle. Since the agent at least partly controls the variable P , he
is held responsible for it, especially because he obtains knowledge of uncontrollable
effects before be chooses his action. This accounts for a refinement of the controllabil-
ity principle, stating that managers should be held responsible for those numbers they
are supposed to pay attention to (cf. Merchant and Van der Stede 2003, p. 464). Since
the principal wishes the agent to account for his private information φ, the performance
measure P is of particular value for incentive purposes. The extent to which it is used,
however, depends on the impact of h, because h is neither controlled by the agent nor
is it predictive of the economic outcome V . Thus, to focus the agent’s attention on the
value-relevant parts of his measured performance, the principal would be interested in
filtering out h. In the next section, variance analysis is introduced as a general device
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for this purpose.
3 Use of additional input information and variance analysis
The above example shows that a performance measure may be almost valueless, even
if it is perfectly correlated with the principal’s objective. The reason for this counter-
intuitive result is that although the incentive contract could account for any variation
in the marginal product δ (this would be done by fixing s = 1), the principal will not
make use of this opportunity because the absolute level of effort would be too high.
Consequently, he will choose a lower level of incentives, which obviously will not
fully account for the possible variations of δ.
To adjust the absolute level of effort, the contract has to incorporate additional
information related to the agent’s input a instead of the output number P . Such in-
formation is frequently considered in variance investigation procedures, which try to
explain deviations between budgeted and realized output numbers by incorporating
additional input information. In the present setting, the difference ∆P = PR − PB of
the realized value PR and the budgeted amount PB of the performance measure could
be split into a component ∆φP due to the variation of φ, and a component ∆aP due to
the deviation of a,
∆P = PR − PB =
(
PR − φBaR
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆φP
+
(
φBaR − φBaB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆aP
, (4)
where the superscripts B and R refer to the budgets and realizations, respectively.5
To conduct this decomposition, a measure of the agent’s input needs to be available.
For simplicity, assume that a is observed by the contracting parties and can be used for
5The realized value of φ cannot enter the calculation, since φ cannot be observed by the principal.
Instead, it is implicitly inferred from P by the residual deviation PR−φBaR, which cannot be explained
by the deviation of a.
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performance evaluation.6 Under the linearity assumption, the compensation contract
becomes
S = s0 + s1a+ s2P. (5)
The agent’s action under this contract will be a(s1, s2) = s1 + s2φ, which enables the
principal to control the absolute level of effort. In the optimal contract, he will fix7
s1 = E[δ]− s2E[φ] and s2 =
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
. (6)
This allows us to write the agent’s compensation in the form
S = s0 + E[δ]a+
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
(P − E[φ]a) . (7)
Owing to the assumption of a two-piece-rate contract, the optimal compensation
can of course be written as a function of some variance. The more interesting question
is how (7) relates to the variance decomposition described in (4), and how this pro-
cedure corresponds to the controllability principle. To address these issues, we write
a = aR for the realized action and take φB = E[φ] as the budgeted value of φ, as
suggested in the literature (Booth and Willett 1997):
S = s0 + E[δ]aR +
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
(
PR − φBaR
)
.
Thus, the agent is held responsible for the variance due to deviations of φ. The con-
trollability principle, in contrast, would demand responsibility for the measures that
the agent can control (cf. Merchant and Van der Stede 2003, p. 30). On first glance,
this is primarily the variance due to deviation aR−aB of effort, which can be included
6More generally, we could consider a noisy measure A = a + ² of the agent’s input. Owing to the
agent’s risk-neutrality, however, this would not affect the results of the paper.
7See Appendix B.1.
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in the compensation scheme by expanding the first variable part:
S = s0 + E[δ]aR +
(
E[δ]aB − E[δ]aB
)
+
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
(
PR − φBaR
)
=
(
s0 + E[δ]aB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s˜0
+
E[δ]
E[φ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s˜1
(
φBaR − φBaB)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆aP
+
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s˜2
(
PR − φBaR
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆φP
. (8)
In examining (8), we see that the agent is held responsible for both special vari-
ances, ∆aP and ∆φP . Does this contradict the controllability principle? The agent
obviously controls ∆aP because it is the variance assigned to the deviation of aR and
aB. However, he also controls ∆φP , since it is computed based on the realized effort
level. The first piece rate, s˜1, motivates the agent to choose the optimal average level
of effort, whereas the second part ensures optimization of his effort profile. Focusing
on the effort profile highlights the importance of the refined controllability principle,
which has already been emphasized in Section 2: since the principal wants the agent
to care about his pre-decision information φ, it is necessary to incorporate the second
variance into the compensation contract. By variance decomposition, the desired ef-
fect can be delineated from the basic incentive, which was impossible under the initial
contract based on P . This clarifies the particular value of the variance analysis: by de-
composition of variances, the principal is able to fine-tune the compensation contract,
stipulating different piece rates for the two variances.
The result is also in line with the informativeness principle, but this requires a com-
prehensive definition of what information the principal is looking for. Of course, once
a has been observed, the performance measure P provides no additional information
with respect to the agent’s action. It is nevertheless useful for contracting because the
principal is not interested in implementing a certain fixed effort level, but the effort
level that is optimal under the agent’s private information φ. Therefore, even if the
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principal observes the agent’s action a, he is still interested in inferring whether the
action chosen is the one most suitable to maximize the expected total surplus. For this
purpose, information on both a and φ is needed, which is provided by a and P .
The approach described conforms to the accounting literature on variance inves-
tigation as well. In general, the variance decomposition method complies with those
proposed in management accounting textbooks, for instance the price and efficiency
variances in cost accounting (Horngren et al. 2006, p. 227ff.). More specifically,
Kloock and Schiller (1997, p. 317) state that variances computed on a budgeted ba-
sis are capable of creating proper ex ante incentives. As mentioned above, this ex ante
perspective is covered by ∆aP . From an ex post perspective, realized amounts are con-
sidered advantageous, since they provide relevant information for planning purposes.
This is fulfilled by the second variance. However, while the conventional argument
refers to future planning periods in this respect, planning in the present model con-
cerns the agent’s action in the current period. The realized effort is used to quantify
the (expected) benefits arising from deviations in φ, motivating him to choose the right
action.
Once we have shown that variance analysis procedures represent a proper instru-
ment to implement the second-best solution in the present model, we can turn to the
question of whether the inclusion of input information resolves the issue raised in
Proposition 1, namely that the value of an informed agent may be negative. For this
purpose, consider the agent’s action aV I = s1 + s2φ resulting from the contract (5)
with variance investigation. Obviously, the optimal action aNI = E[δ] of an unin-
formed agent is readily obtained by choosing s1 = E[δ] and s2 = 0, and the ambiguity
of Proposition 1 disappears.
Proposition 2 In the risk-neutral agency setting with observable effort, the value of
information to the agency is non-negative.
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Proof Obvious from the above considerations.
My next goal is to derive the conditions under which optimal alignment is achieved.
For this purpose, compare the action
a∗(φ) = E[δ] +
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
(φ− E[φ]) (9)
resulting from the second-best contract (7) to the first-best action aFB = E[δ | φ],
as given in Section 2. Obviously, the latter can be implemented by a simple linear
contract of the form (1) (without observation of a) only if the expected value of δ is
proportionate to φ. With observation of a, there is an additional degree of freedom in
the compensation scheme. Scheme (7) will align the interests of the agent and principal
if (9) is the conditional expectation of δ, given φ.
Proposition 3 In the risk-neutral agency setting with observable effort, a first-best
solution can be obtained by a linear contract if the conditional expectation of the
agent’s marginal product δ is a linear function of the sensitivity φ to his performance
measure.
Proof If the expected value of δ, given φ, is a linear function of φ, there exist
λ1, λ2 ∈ R such that E[δ | φ] = λ1 + λ2φ for all realizations of φ. Using a linear
contract of the form (7), the agent chooses a(φ) = s1E[φ] + s2 (φ− E[φ]). Thus,
setting s2 = λ2 and s1 = λ2 + λ1/E[φ] yields the first-best action a∗∗ = E[δ | φ]. 2
If the conditional expectation of δ is a linear function of φ, can it be replicated by a
linear contract.8 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the linearity requirement
8We could look for distributions that meet this condition and allow for the first-best solution. This
is obviously the case for all distributions meeting the linear conditional expectation. A well-known
example is the class of elliptical distributions, of which the normal distribution is a special case. A
larger class is the Pearson family (see Wei et al. 1999 for details). Beyond this, discrete distributions
that fulfil the requirement can also be constructed.
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is perfect correlation of δ and φ, in which case δ itself is a linear function of φ by
definition. Moreover, under perfect correlation the first-best outcome is identical to
the full-information outcome, where the principal has perfect knowledge of δ.
Corrollary 1 If δ and φ are perfectly correlated in the risk-neutral agency setting with
observable effort, the full-information solution can be obtained by a linear contract.
Proof Under perfect correlation, a linear relation δ = λ1 + λ2φ holds for some
λ1, λ2 ∈ R and all realizations of δ and φ. Setting s2 = λ2 and s1 = λ2 + λ1E[φ]
induces a = δ, which yields the full-information solution.
Corollary 1 is a special case of Proposition 3. Under perfect correlation, δ can
be inferred unambiguously from φ, and symmetric information is equivalent to full
information. Thus, it seems obvious that, contrary to the example of Section 2, the
correlation of δ and φ has a positive impact on the principal’s benefit, at least if the
conditions of Proposition 1 are fulfilled. To analyze this in general, we denote the
correlation of δ and φ by ρ. The agent’s action (9) under the two-piece-rate contract
(7) can then be written as
aV I = E[δ] + ρ
√√√√Var[δ]
Var[φ]
(φ− E[φ]) .
By substitution of this term in the principal’s objective function, the expected total
surplus becomes9
E[V − C]V I =
1
2
(
E[δ]2 + ρ2Var[δ]
)
. (10)
A comparison of (10) and (3) reveals that, contrary to the situation without observable
effort, the performance measure now affects the agency’s surplus only by the correla-
9See Appendix B.2.
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tion of δ and φ. The latter therefore perfectly indicates the quality of a performance
measure for a linear contract.
Proposition 4 In the risk-neutral agency setting with observable effort, the agency’s
surplus is increasing in the correlation between the agent’s marginal product δ and
the sensitivity φ of his performance measure.
Proof Obvious from Eq. (10).
Proposition 4 condenses the insight that in the risk-neutral agency with distorted
performance measurement, dealing with the agent’s private information is merely a
matter of inferring his marginal product from the sensitivity of the performance mea-
sure applied. Observing the agent’s effort enables the principal to use a linear regres-
sion, where the correlation coefficient indicates the quality of the inference.
4 Participative budgeting
So far I have assumed that the agent’s private information cannot be communicated to
the principal because of timing effects or limited information channels. Without this
restriction, an obvious device to improve effort allocation is the agent’s participation
in budgeting. In economic terms, this corresponds to offering a menu of contracts to
the agent. In this respect, most of the literature has focussed on the tradeoff of infor-
mation rents and inefficiencies of allocation (cf. Antle and Eppen 1988 and Antle and
Fellingham 1990 as the most prominent examples). Since in the present model the
agent is risk-neutral and acquires private information only after he has signed the con-
tract, however, implementation is without an additional cost because any information
rent can be extracted by an upfront payment. The problem therefore reduces to the
question of whether a certain action profile is implementable.
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A well-known result in this respect is that under optimal contracting, using a menu
of contracts is of no value compared to a single contract if the agent’s action and his
private information unambiguously determine the outcome, except for additive noise
(Melumad and Reichelstein 1989; Caillaud et al. 1992). In the present model, how-
ever, contract design is restricted in two respects. First, I have confined myself to the
analysis of linear contracts, which is generally not be capable of mimicking the allo-
cation of a menu of contracts. 10 Second, in contrast to the above results, the contract
can only be written on the distorted performance measure P , which further restricts
the design of incentives. Hence, although the agent’s performance is determined by
his action a and private information φ, and is only perturbed by white noise ², menus
of contracts may help to make further use of his knowledge of φ.
The extent to which the agent’s private information can be exploited depends on
what the principal can observe. If a is observable, the first-best solution can easily be
achieved by prescribing the first-best effort a(φˆ) = E[δ | φˆ] for any announced level φˆ
of φ, thereby compensating the agent for the resulting cost of effort. This eliminates
the moral hazard problem, and budget participation becomes merely a matter of elicit-
ing the agent’s private information, which can be achieved by a mechanism according
to Osband and Reichelstein (1985), in which deviations of budgeted and realized per-
formance are punished by a convex incentive scheme11
S(Pˆ , P ) = l(Pˆ ) + l′(Pˆ )[P − Pˆ ], (11)
where Pˆ = φˆa(φˆ) denotes the budgeted performance, and l(·) is an arbitrary convex
10Such a contract would be the upper envelope of contingent contracts, which will hardly be linear.
11Another well-known mechanism is that proposed by Weitzman (1976). Unlike the scheme of Os-
band and Reichelstein, however, the Weitzman scheme would reveal a quantile of the distribution of P
instead of its expectation.
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function.12 Such penalties again introduce the structure of variance analysis into the
contract, but as a means of disciplining the agent in participative budgeting rather than
inferring the agent’s private information, as in the framework without communication.
If a cannot be contracted on, the problems of moral hazard and private information
cannot be separated, and a more subtle contract has to be used. Again, the agent
will not earn an informational rent because he obtains private information only after
contracting. However, the first-best solution can only be achieved if certain regularities
are met. To examine this subject, I confine myself to the analysis of menus of linear
contracts, following my previous analysis of cases without communication. For a
linear contract S(P, φˆ) = s0(φˆ)+ s1(φˆ)P , conditional to the announced value φˆ of the
agent’s private information, the agent will choose an effort level a(φˆ) = s1(φˆ)φ, and
his expected utility under this action choice is given by
W (φˆ, φ) ≡ E[U(s0(φˆ), s1(φˆ), φ)] = s0(φˆ) +
s1(φˆ)
2φ2
2
For this indirect utility, the problem can be analyzed using the standard model of mech-
anism design (Salanie 1997, p. 26ff.; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p. 257ff.). A famil-
iar result is that if the marginal rate of substitution between the allocation (in this case
s1(φˆ)) and transfer (s0(φˆ)) has a constant sign (the so-called single-crossing or sorting
condition) and is bounded for all transfers, any non-decreasing/non-increasing allo-
cation is implementable—depending on the sign of the sorting condition (Guesnerie
and Laffont 1984, Theorem 2). Under an increasing allocation s1(·), for example, the
agent must be willing to pay more (i.e. to accept higher cuts in his base salary) for
an increase in his share s1 if he observes higher values of φ. Then, different types
12Since P is distorted by white noise, the agent in this case has to be compensated for the expected
punishment under truthful reporting. Due to the agent’s risk-neutrality, such sanctions are free of cost
to the principal.
18
of agents can be separated by offering larger variable payments for higher-sensitivity
products and making the agent pay for this privilege. 13
Based on this rationale, it can be studied under which conditions the first-best
allocation can be induced, and what type of contract results. The first issue reduces to
the question of whether the regularity conditions are met for the first-best effort level
aFB = E[δ | φ].
Proposition 5 In the risk-neutral agency setting without observable effort, the first-
best action can be implemented by a menu of linear contracts if E[δ | φ]/φ is an
increasing function of φ.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 proves that the first-best action can be induced if the respective share
parameter s01 is an increasing function of the agent’s information φ. That is, not only
should a higher effort be optimal for higher levels of φ, but it also needs to be im-
plemented by a higher share of P .14 A decreasing first-best allocation is not imple-
mentable because the agent would always pretend to be of type φ, irrespective of his
observation.
Separation of agents also does not happen if E[δ | φ]/φ is constant, in which case
the same contract is offered for all announced values of φ. As is easily seen, this refers
to a situation where E[δ | φ] is proportionate to φ, and the first-best action can be
induced by a single linear contract (see Section 2). If s01 is strictly increasing, the first-
best allocation can be induced by a revelation mechanism that discriminates between
13For a decreasing allocation, this logic has to be reversed.
14This limitation arises because the sorting condition is always fulfilled in its positive form, as de-
scribed above.
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types. The corresponding menu of linear contracts is given by15
S0(φˆ) = s00(φˆ) + s
0
1(φˆ)P
= W (φ, φ) +
∫ φˆ
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ+
E[δ | φˆ]2
2
+
E[δ | φˆ]
φˆ
(
P − E[δ | φˆ]φˆ
)
.
Again, the last term exhibits a variance structure, which can further be clarified by
fixing budgets φB = φˆ and aB = E[δ | φˆ]:
S0(φB) = W (φ, φ)+
∫ φB
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
revelation term
+
(aB)2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort compensation
+ s1(φ
B)
[
P − aBφB
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
variance analysis term
. (12)
The budget φB is set by the agent, yielding the budgeted effort aB = E[δ | φB] in a
prespecified way. Under truthful reporting, the variance term has an expected value of
zero, and the agent will be compensated for his disutility of effort. To achieve truth-
telling, higher values of φ have to yield higher utilities, which is guaranteed by the
revelation term on the left. Finally, the base salary W (φ, φ) for the least profitable type
φ is fixed to provide the agent’s reservation utility. The structure of the compensation
contract shows that, in contrast to the setting with observable effort and no communi-
cation, the agent is made responsible for the whole deviation P − aBφB = P −PB of
realized and budgeted performance, without any distinction in the magnitude of incen-
tives. Different rates for different special variances are not necessary under participa-
tive budgeting because the agent’s private information is revealed by his choice among
the contracts offered. The average level of effort, as well as its distinction according
to the marginal product, is controlled in a single step. Once the agent has committed
to a certain budget, the total variance suffices to ensure that he will not differ from
the corresponding action. This is well in line with the controllability principle: since
15See Appendix B.3.
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the agent observes φ and fixes the budget PB = φBaB by announcing φB, he fully
controls the deviation P −PB , except for the additive noise. Since the latter cannot be
factored out, rewarding P − PB is the best the principal can do if he does not observe
a.
By comparison of (12) to the incentive scheme (11) with observable effort, the
benefits from additional input information become obvious: although both schemes
exhibit a similar structure, S0 is limited because, contrary to (11), in (12) it does not
suffice to punish deviation by an arbitrary increasing function l′(·). The share parame-
ter also has to induce the first-best action, which under observable effort is achieved by
a forcing contract. With unobservable effort, the contract has to serve two purposes,
which—as Proposition 5 shows—can only be brought in line under certain conditions.
Thus, at least with regard to the first-best allocation, the observation of a will be of
value whenever the requirement of Proposition 5 is not fulfilled.
Finally, to return to the starting point of this section, we see that, in contrast to
the classical models on communication in agencies (Melumad and Reichelstein 1989;
Caillaud and Guesnerie 1992), budget participation may well be of value in the present
model, despite its simple informational assumptions: with observable effort, commu-
nication is of value whenever the requirements of Proposition 3 are not met. Without
this input information, Proposition 5 shows that communication is of value if the first-
best action is implemented in a separating equilibrium. This highlights the fact that
performance measure distortion substantially limits the use of participative budgeting:
if budgets refer to V instead of P , implementing the first-best solution would of course
not be an issue. Thus, the restriction to linear contracts alone would not warrant the
use of participative budgeting, which is only of value under distorted performance
measurement.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the role of variance investigation procedures in mitigating the
problem of effort misallocation in an agency setting with distorted performance mea-
surement. It was shown that variance analysis improves the optimal linear contract in
most cases for which the performance measure is not in line with the principal’s objec-
tive. By application of variance investigation, the quality of a particular performance
measure for a privately informed agent can be quantified using the correlation of its
marginal product and that of the principal’s objective. Special variances have a natural
interpretation in this setting: they quantify the expected deviation from the principal’s
objective, given a performance measure deviation. Using deviations instead of total
amounts, the effects of measured performance can be translated into value effects.
Thus, the objectives of the principal and agent can be aligned via compensation.
If the agent can communicate his private information, participative budgeting changes
the role of variance analysis. While under top-down budgeting the agent is held respon-
sible for the two variances to different extents, under participation he bears responsi-
bility for the overall deviation of realized and budgeted performance. Such complete
stewardship, however, is feasible only under certain conditions. Otherwise, additional
information on the agent’s input may be used to achieve complete alignment.
The results of this paper can be related to the recent discussion of strategic perfor-
mance measurement. My starting point was the exclusive use of financial accounting
measures, which have been considered incongruent with the long-term objectives of
the firm. In this paper, traditional accounting practices, namely variance analysis and
participative budgeting, have been proven capable of alleviating this incongruity. It
was found that variance analysis particularly helps in situations in which the agent’s
marginal products are strongly correlated with the sensitivities of the (retrospective)
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accounting measures.
Such correlation occurs in situations in which a manager’s impact on the firm’s
long-term objectives can be separated into an undirected effect related to the absolute
level of his activities and a directed effect proportional to his short-term objectives (in-
cluding profit). Taking into account that current profit is an inherent part of the firm’s
overall financial objective, such situations may best be described by a stable environ-
ment, in which current opportunities (φ) represent a good predictor of the long-term
prospects of success (δ), or a business with little strategic focus, in which the firm’s
long-term objectives mainly depend on the absolute level of the manager’s current ac-
tivities, but there is no concrete plan describing how this effort should best be allocated.
None of these scenarios fully complies with the competitive environment for which
strategic measurement systems are proposed. Therefore, the results of the paper do not
overcome the necessity for additional (non-financial) measures to align the objectives
of organizational members with the firm’s strategy. They rather provide evidence for
situations in which their application appears to be less essential.
A Proof of Proposition 5
Let s1(φ) be the allocation to be implemented. A necessary and sufficient condition
for s1 to be implementable is
∂2
∂s1∂φ
(
s1(φˆ)
2φ2
2
)
ds1
dφ
(φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
φˆ=φ
= (2s1(φ)φ)
ds1
dφˆ
(φ) ≥ 0, (A.1)
meaning that the sensitivity product φ affects the agent’s marginal utility from an in-
crease in s1 in a systematic way (Salanie 1997, p. 30). The sorting condition requires
that the cross-derivative in (A.1) is positive (SC+) or negative (SC−) for all φ. Un-
der the additional assumption that the cross-derivative is smaller than K0 +K1|s0| for
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some K0, K1 ∈ R and all φ, any non-decreasing (for SC+) or non-increasing (for
SC−) allocation is implementable (Guesnerie and Laffont 1984, Theorem 2).
The second regularity condition is met because the supports of both φ and δ are
bounded. Therefore, substitution of the first-best share parameter s01(φˆ) = E[δ | φˆ]/φˆ
in (A.1) yields
(
2s01(φ)φ
) ds01
dφˆ
(φ) = 2E[δ | φ]
d
dφ
(
E[δ | φ]
φ
)
≥ 0 (A.2)
as a necessary condition for the first-best solution to be implementable. Since by
assumption the marginal product δ of the agent’s action is positive, the same holds for
its expectation E[δ | φ]. Thus, the sorting condition CS+ is always met, and condition
(A.2) reduces to
d
dφ
(
E[δ | φ]
φ
)
≥ 0, (A.3)
where the desired allocation is non-decreasing in the agent’s information φ. Due to the
sorting condition CS+, condition (A.3) is also sufficient for implementation (Salanie
1997, p. 31).
B Further computations
B.1 Contract parameters (6)
Based on P and a, a linear contract is of the form S = s0 + s1a + s2P , resulting in
an action choice a(φ) = s1 + s2φ. Substituting this into the principal’s objective of
maximizing total surplus
E[V − S] = E
[
δa(φ)−
a(φ)2
2
]
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yields the optimization problem
max
s1,s2
E[V − S] = s1E[δ] + s2E[δφ]−
s21
2
− s1s2E[φ]−
s22
2
E[φ2].
From the first-order conditions
∂E[V − S]
∂s1
= E[δ]− s1 − s2E[φ] = 0
and
∂E[V − S]
∂s2
= E[δφ]− s1E[φ]− s2E[φ2] = 0
I derive
s1 = E[δ]− s2E[φ] and s2 =
E[δφ]− E[δ]E[φ]
E[φ2]− E[φ]2
=
Cov[δφ]
Var[φ]
for the optimal values of s1 and s2, respectively, which coincides with (7). 2
B.2 Expected surplus from a contract with two piece rates
The agent’s incentive constraint yields
a∗ = s1 + s2φ = E[δ] + s2 (φ− E[φ])
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where I use the fact that s1 = E[δ] − s2E[φ]. Substituting this into the gross profit
yields
V − C = δa∗ −
(a∗)2
2
= δ[s1 + s2φ] +
[s1 + s2φ]
2
2
= δ [E[δ] + s2 (φ− E[φ])]−
[E[δ] + s2 (φ− E[φ])]2
2
.
Computation of expectations gives
E[V − C] = E[δ]2 + s2E[δφ− δE[φ]]
−
1
2
(
E[δ]2 + 2s2E[δ]E[φ− E[φ]] + s22E[φ− E[φ]]2
)
=
1
2
E[δ]2 + s2Cov[δ, φ]−
1
2
s22Var[φ].
Substitution of s2 = Cov[δ,φ]Var[φ] yields
E[V − C] =
1
2
E[δ]2 +
Cov[δ, φ]
Var[φ]
Cov[δ, φ]− 1
2
Cov[δ, φ]2
Var[φ]2
Var[φ]
=
1
2
(
E[δ]2 +
Cov[δ, φ]2
Var[φ]
)
=
1
2
(
E[δ]2 + ρ2Var[δ]
)
.
B.3 Derivation of the revelation mechanism
The agent’s marginal utility under truth-telling and s01 is given by16
d
dφ
W (φ, φ) =
∂
∂φ
W (φˆ, φ) =
(
s01(φ)
)2
φ =
E[δ | φ]2
φ
.
16For the following, cf. Salanie (1997) p. 33f.
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From this, I can derive the utility
W (φ, φ) = W (φ, φ) +
∫ φ
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ
for an agent of type φ, which yields the required fixed payment
s00(φ) = W (φ, φ)−
s01(φ)
2φ2
2
= W (φ, φ) +
∫ φ
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ−
E[δ | φ]2
2
.
Finally, W (φ, φ) is chosen to meet the agent’s participation constraint. The resulting
total compensation S(φ) = s00(φ) + s01(φ) is
S0(φ) = s00(φ) + s
0
1(φ)
= W (φ, φ) +
∫ φ
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ−
E[δ | φ]2
2
+
E[δ | φ]
φ
P
= W (φ, φ) +
∫ φ
φ
E[δ | ϕ]2
ϕ
dϕ+
E[δ | φ]2
2
+
E[δ | φ]
φ
(P − E[δ | φ]φ) .
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